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Abstract 
The article deals with the possibilities of estimating the amount of tax evasion concerning value added tax in the fuel market in 
the Czech Republic. Part of the text is the evaluation of the existing standard methods used for measuring tax evasion. It has been 
proved that these methods are not suitable for determining the amount of fuel tax evasion under given conditions. The authors 
propose a specific original method of quantification of tax evasion on the basis of data concerning distributor prices, gathered 
during the year 2012, and information obtained from the survey of interested entities. 
 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ECE 2014. 
Keywords: Fuels; tax evasion; value added tax 
1. Introduction 
The beginnings of serious examination of tax evasion date back to the early 1980s. However, the practice of tax 
evasion is inherent in the existence of tax levy, which has its origin in the remote past. Studies focusing on 
determination of the extent of hidden economy by existing theoretical models were published as late as at the 
beginning of the 21st century.  
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) formed a static and later also dynamic model of the taxpayer's behavior, where 
the variables of tendency to tax evasion were tax rates as such, severity of penalties and probability of inspection 
which determines the probability of detection. However, they recommend empirical investigation to verify the facts. 
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The above mentioned models are based on the optimal portfolio theory and theory of economics of uncertainty. 
Andreoni (1992) introduces an interesting fact into the decision-making process concerning engaging in tax evasion: 
punishment for the evasion in the case of detection comes later than the gain resulting from the tax evasion. 
Therefore the situation is in favor of tax evasion. The above effect assumes a certain short-sightedness of those who 
commit the fraud. This implication applies both to the direct tax and to the indirect tax, which is the subject of our 
research. 
The commodity under examination is fuels, which are subject to several indirect taxes at a time. Even if we 
disregard the fact that tax evasion is an economic crime, the evasion itself causes a significant loss in the revenue of 
the state budget. Tax evasion may represent billions of Czech crowns per year, depending on the link of the 
distribution chain where the tax evader operates and the manner in which the tax duty is circumvented. Identification 
of possible estimates has been performed on the case of the Czech Republic. According to official estimates, annual 
loss should amount to CZK 4–8 billion (MF CR, 2011; CAPPO, 2012), which only concerns the value added tax. 
The methods of estimating the amount are not known, and therefore it cannot be proved or disproved.  
We have to decide how to approach the issue of tax evasion. It is possible to work with real data and situations, to 
describe the reality and examine its changes according to factual analysis, and yet avoid the application of results in 
the form of economic and political recommendations and judgments about the actual state of affairs. The alternative 
is to examine and describe the optimal situation, derive value judgments and recommendations, focus on the ideal 
relations between the variables and stress the implications of the results on the economic policy, with the resulting 
judgments about what the state of affairs should be and what must be done to achieve it. The theory of tax evasion 
distinguishes between the positive and normative approach (Slemrod, 2007). It is apparent that authors adhering to 
the positive approach, such as Becker (1968), Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Sandmo (2005) or Chen and Chu 
(2005) focus on methods of determination of tax evasion rate or tax gaps with the ideal aim to objectively describe 
existing features and facts. At the same time they monitor results of measures that have been applied in order to 
reduce tax gap or tax evasion, e.g. Torgler (2003) or Scholz and Lubell (2001). The alternative is testing taxpayers 
via laboratory experiments, which is supported by research of Spicer and Becker (1980) or Alm et al. (1992). The 
normative approach to tax evasion, on the other hand, is based on available data on the tax evasion rate and seeks or 
regulates tools for its reduction; e.g. Mayshar (1991) or Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). The above authors scarcely 
combine the positive and normative approach; more often they use either one in individual publications.  
 Unlike the mentioned authors, we shall concentrate on a particular (not general) issue and its concrete solution; 
we do not intend to stipulate general principles of resolution of tax evasion. After introducing the situation of tax 
evasion first in general and subsequently more specifically concerning the value added tax in the Czech Republic, 
our aim is normative formulation of a tool for measurement of tax evasion in this particular area. This approach is 
also preferred by Blough (1952). Because the area of our research is very narrow, we can afford to take advantage of 
the positive and then the normative approach to the issue of tax evasion in the context of value added tax on fuels in 
the Czech Republic. 
2. Methods 
We started our research with finding out about the conditions and manners of distribution which are usual in the 
market. The fuel distributor is a person that sells or is authorized to sell fuel in the Czech Republic, except sale of 
fuel from petrol stations (Section 2 j), Fuel Act). Approximately 160 distributors of fuels were registered at the 
beginning of 2014 (Customs Administration, 2014). Such distributors have a special recording duty. They monthly 
fill in reports for the tax administrator, containing e.g. date of purchase, supplier's specification, and unit price per 
liter or ton of mineral oil. The price may be referred to as one of the fuel identifiers affected by tax evasion. Entities 
participating in the tax fraud can afford to sell at lower prices than their fair competitors, and yet achieve excessive 
profits. At the same time they can gain the market share that would have been unattainable had they not committed 
tax evasion and had they set reasonable prices (David and Semerád, 2014). The sale, or the purchase prices are not 
publicly known, but it can be assumed that they are available to the General Financial Directorate (“GFD”), and 
therefore they may be used in theoretical calculation. Under Act No. 106/1999 Coll., on Free Access to Information, 
as amended, we asked the GFD (2012) to provide us with distributor prices ensuing from the fulfilment of the 
special recording duty in 2012. However, the GFD was able to give us only average distributor prices APGFD and 
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minimal distributor prices MPGFD reported by distributors as part of their recording duty in 2012. The codes 
27101141 and 27101145 for petrol Natural 95 were selected for our purposes. The lowest price for the period 
concerned was always chosen. The “period” is a time interval from Tuesday to Monday, corresponding to weekly 
prices of ČEPRO, a.s.  
Short-term special offers may appear in the market, which are more advantageous than the usual prices. Semerád 
(2013) points out another market possibility i.e. purchase of goods in advance and their later sale. In case the 
distributor stores fuel in a storage facility, it is obliged to pay the storage fee to its operator. Therefore, such costs 
must also be taken into account. 
When verifying availability of prices of the respective distributors, we obtained only the basic weekly prices BP 
from ČEPRO, a.s. (CEPRO, 2012). The other companies anxiously conceal their price lists and they cannot be 
monitored on a long-term basis, nor is it possible to determine the price level usual for concrete types of fuel. It was 
ascertained on the basis of previous survey research that the distributors themselves consider the deviation of up to 
CZK 0.50 from usual prices as acceptable (this also applies to BP). The questionnaire survey was taken in July and 
August 2013. The questionnaire was sent to 700 potential respondents, and the rate of return was 22 %, i.e. 154 
entities responded. The respondents included distributors and service station operators and other entities related to 
the market. It follows from the survey that 82 % of respondents said the value of the difference between the prices of 
alternative suppliers potentially affected by tax fraud and their usual suppliers' prices was 0.5 1 CZK/l or more. On 
the other hand, if the deviation is bigger, they challenge the price origin and tend to suspect that such fuel is affected 
by tax evasion. Therefore we further adjust APGFD and reduce it by the value based on a qualified estimate of 
distributors, obtaining the average adjusted price of fuel AAPGFD. 
With view to interpretations of the respective available prices we can perform their comparison. On this basis we 
may identify the risk zone in terms of possibility of tax evasion in relation to the fuel price. We focus primarily on 
the deviation between prices that can be considered duly taxed and attainable in the market and prices below such 
imaginary line (in the risk zone in terms of potential fraud). However, we accept the view that not all the prices 
within the risk zone have to be affected by tax fraud. It is also apparent that the concrete amount of tax evasion 
cannot be quantified unless we obtain detailed prices. Besides, our research is based on anonymous prices without 
detailed description of entities entering into transactions in the form of fuel sale, which means that we are not able to 
identify subsequent resale of the concrete fuel. Apart from the identification of a concrete risk zone and existence of 
a price occurring in such zone in a given period, the outcome of logic and mathematic methods used is the 
determination of the theoretical formula for the quantification of the amount of tax evasion concerning the value 
added tax in the Czech Republic, which can assume practical values for the tax administrator who has the input data 
available in the form of prices applied by all the fuel distributors in the Czech Republic. Our findings shall enable us 
to identify the concrete volume of fuel sold within the risk zone, and thus to determine the percentage of shadow 
economy in any period of time. 
3. Results 
The direct method for the quantification of tax evasion concerning income taxes was applied e.g. by Fiorio and 
D'Amuri (2006). Direct anonymous inquiry was accepted by experts as relevant for the determination of the tax 
evasion rate at that time. Therefore, the combination of direct and indirect inquiry seems suitable for the 
measurement of VAT evasion in the case of fuels, where both methods can be compared in order to verify the 
results obtained. The authors point out that the sample of respondents must be chosen very carefully. 
Many options of tax evasion measurement are offered in the book by Feige and Edgar (1989), which, beside 
introductory chapters written by the authors, contains contributions dealing with tax evasion and distortion of 
reported information. Various authors publish different approaches of determination of extent and development of 
underground economy. However, the respective methods show significant imperfections. Often, the transaction 
method cannot be applied due to shortage and unavailability of the necessary data. The method using questionnaire 
survey is limited by biased evaluation of oneself and by questionable credibility of respondents’ answers. The 
possibility of distortion must be admitted also within the framework of the direct method of identification of tax 
evasion concerning the value added tax on fuels in the Czech Republic, which we applied. We work with 
respondents who may state false or distorted data in the questionnaires. The same risk applies to data provided by 
124   Petr David and Pavel Semerád /  Procedia Economics and Finance  12 ( 2014 )  121 – 129 
the GFD. Although these are official data of the tax administration, their origin may have been distorted by 
distributors themselves. The problem was identified when we processed the data and discovered apparent anomalies 
in prices. It cannot be either proved or disproved whether this was intentional distortion or an inadvertent mistake, 
unless tax inspection is performed. The GFD should claim correction or justification of the prices by the distributors 
in similar dubious cases. 
The method of measuring the tax gap is often applied for the quantification of tax evasion. It is a relatively simple 
method and is used e.g. by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (Black et al., 2012), although its information value 
concerning tax evasion is relatively low. The empirical research of income tax evasion in the form of a tax gap was 
carried out by Cebula and Feige (2012), using data of three time periods in the U.S.A. The authors ascertained that 
the tax gap amounted to 18–19 % of the total revenue. The modified general currency ratio model was used for the 
determination of this value, which entailed relatively large limitations. It was necessary to define the starting period 
in which it was assumed that the tax evasion was zero, that the entire stock of currency was held in the country 
concerned, and that the sole determinant of change in the demand for currency was a change in tax evasion amounts. 
Even here a number of assumptions strongly influencing the measurement results occur, although this concerns the 
direct tax, whereas the subject of our examination was the indirect tax. 
Alm (2012) distinguishes between traditional and modern methods of measuring tax evasion and admits that the 
existing tools are not sufficient for achieving the authors' goals. The traditional methods are classified as the 
measurement of tax evasion by means of indicators of shadow economy, non-compliance with tax duties and 
Internet transactions. The measurement method of underground economy by ascertaining the proportion of cash 
transactions to GNP was elaborated by Gutmann (1977) and Feige (1979). Tanzi (1980) defined the proportion of 
cash transactions as the indicator M2 by application of the above method, and he interpreted changes in its value by 
changes in tax incidence. However, this method is based on assumptions that have not been verified, and the results 
are strongly influenced by the manner of determination of demand for cash. In spite of that, the study of Engel and 
Hines (1999), carried out in the conditions of the U.S. economy, proved the relevance of the method if high quality 
data and a long time line are available. 
The modern methods, according to Alm (2012), include measurement of reported and non-reported income in 
case of direct taxes, as well as generally applicable controlled experiments. However, he points out that all these 
methods lack direct measurement of tax evasion which is a suitable component of tax evasion quantification. 
Within a limited scope, Slemrod et al. (2001) succeeded in application of a controlled experiment. After the 
announcement of future tax inspections, the value of reported income of taxpayers with low to medium income 
provably increased. However, such increase was not proved in taxpayers who had high income. The opposite was 
true. A certain path to the measurement of at least the change in the value of tax evasion after the application of 
tools for its reduction or elimination can be seen here. Unfortunately, such measurements can only be evaluated ex 
post, which prevents us from devising necessary measures supported by the previous research. 
Micro and macro models of quantification of tax evasion were formulated by Nam et al. (2001). The micro model 
using data of the respective entities was applied by Mogensen et al. (1995). Macro models examining the gap 
between the statistics of income and costs were later used by MacAfee (1980); correlation between the currency 
demand and tax pressure was applied by Tanzi (1982); the relation between the energy consumption and GDP was 
described by Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). And last but not least, we have econometric models which consider 
various macroeconomic variables for the determination of the extent of shadow economy (Schneider, 2000). The 
authors do not see potential for use in the measurement of tax evasion from indirect taxes, moreover in the case of 
particular commodities, in these methods, which are focused on tax evasion in general or, as the case may be, 
evasion from direct taxes. 
By summarizing the relevant factors that determine tax evasion rate affecting indirect taxes in the form of tax 
rate, probability of inspection, or more specifically, probability of fraud detection, approach of the taxpayer to risk, 
the condition and development of economy, we get a general overview of causalities in the area concerned. The 
above mentioned facts should be supplemented with other factors, which overlap with the mentioned ones to an 
extent. This mainly concerns the stability of legal environment, quality of legislation and will of public 
administration to deal with the problem.  
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) offer entirely general models of decision making concerning tax evasion. The 
benefit is that the model acknowledges the taxpayer's aversion to risk, however the applicability of the model in a 
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concrete case of a certain tax and commodity is practically zero due to unavailability of variables and the selection 
of variables; therefore we shall disregard it in our research. 
Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007) verified that the results of tax evasion quantification through the application of the 
expected utility theory were surprising, or better, nonsensical. Given the audit probability and rates of sanction for 
tax evasion at the time and venue of the research, 91 to 98 % taxpayers would venture tax evasion. This suggests 
that the correct method of tax evasion quantification is the key factor for achieving results that at least 
approximately illustrate the real state of affairs. The authors use the above mentioned information to supplement 
their methods with other instruments of the theory of cumulative expectation and theory of selection in order to 
rationalize the estimates of tax evasion. 
Gebauer et al. (2007) measure the extent of tax evasion in EU countries, ranging from 5 % to 10 %, by means of 
comparison of theoretical and really collected tax in the examined period of years 1995 to 2002. However, this 
method is too broad for our purposes, in that it does not enable to identify detailed data concerning VAT on one 
commodity of fuel. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Modification of markets prices of petrol Natural 95  
Figure 1 depicts the selected types of prices of petrol Natural 95 in the Czech Republic from 1 May to 30 
September 2012. BP is the price that may be provided by ČEPRO, a.s. storage facility to a typical customer without 
the necessity of the customer's meeting the stipulated storage volume. We use prices of ČEPRO, a.s. for two 
reasons. One is the availability of their data and, what is even more important, is that their storage facilities are 
evenly distributed throughout the territory of the Czech Republic unlike those of competing companies, which 
contributes to lower costs of transportation.  
The price CP is based on these considerations and reflects possibilities enabled by certain storage facilities. Such 
possibilities include the storage of goods at a storage fee usually charged for a calendar month. In practice it means 
that if distributors purchase goods for p and the price increases to p+Δp during a week or a month, they sell with 
profit after the deduction of the storage fee. In the opposite case, if the acquisition costs are higher than the final sale 
price, they sell with loss. We were informed by ČEPRO, a.s. about their storage terms, and we based our 
calculations on the fee for the first calendar month, amounting to 0.30 CZK/l. For each subsequent commenced 
calendar month of storage, the amount of 0.08 CZK/l is added. This may not be profitable in certain months, which 
is apparent in the first 9 weeks of the monitored period. Here, we face the problem of quantity discounts and lower 
than benchmark prices. For this reason we addressed the GFD and asked for information about average distributor 
prices APGFD in the selected period, which prices are lower than those of ČEPRO, a.s. Also this price had to be 
further modified and we used our knowledge of the market in order to find out what price is attainable in the market 
without being affected by tax fraud. As mentioned in the methodological part of the text, the questionnaire survey 
established that according to the qualified opinion of distributors, prices lower by as much as 0.50 CZK/l than prices 
of usual suppliers could be accepted. A higher difference was considered a tax fraud. The price APGFD was adjusted 
26
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to AAPGFD on the basis of the above information, and AAPGFD also modified and even lowered the level of prices 
attainable without fraud in some weeks. An important line is MPGFD, representing the lowest distributor prices in the 
monitored period.  
The risk zone RZ is the area between the lower value of CP and AAPGFD, and MPGFD. In case a risk zone 
appeared in the given period, we have the certainty that at least one price was present in the market which showed a 
high risk of being affected by tax evasion. Subsequently we can identify sale prices that belong to the risk zone. 
 
௜ܲ  א ܴܼ, if ௜ܲ  ൏ ܯܲܮ, where         (1) 
 
MPL is a fictitious line formed by the lower of AAPGFD and CP. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Identification of risk zone in petrol Natural 95 
The gap between MPGFD and the lower of AAPGFD and CP is apparent in Fig. 2. This gap is defined as the risk 
zone liable to tax evasion in the monitored period between weeks 19 and 40 of 2012 in the case of Natural 95. The 
existence of the risk zone in each of the monitored moments evidences the existence of at least one price in Czech 
market with the commodity concerned that shows signs of tax fraud.  
Therefore our calculation of the tax evasion amount is based on the defined risk zone and affiliation of the sales 
prices to that risk zone, whereas the following conditions must be met: (i) The illogical, extremely low prices 
obtained from the GFD shall be eliminated. Certain anomalies may appear in the database, where the lowest price is 
by 1.00 to 3.00 CZK lower than the second lowest price. Therefore the second lowest price should be chosen, 
because it better expresses the relationship to the other prices in the weekly period. Although anomalies in prices 
from the GFD were found, which differed by more than one crown in the monitored weekly period, our 
recommendation is to ask the distributor for correction or explanation. (ii) The homogeneity of the product which is 
the subject of price calculation must be ensured. The main factor is the Combined Nomenclature Code, which 
guarantees that the product is not mistaken for another one. The combination of two nomenclatures for petrol 
Natural 95, which had identical physical and chemical parameters, was used in the above chart. Whereas 
designations entered by distributors were different, the codes were the same. 
Supposing the above mentioned conditions are met, we may define the formula for calculation of the amount of 
potential tax evasion TEA. 
 
ܶܧܣ ൌ ܸܣ ோܶ ൈ σ ሺ ௜ܲ ൈ ܳ௜ሻ௡௜ୀ଴ , if ௜ܲ  ൏ ܯܲܮ, where      (2) 
 
TEA is the potential tax evasion amount, 
VATR is the nominal value added tax rate, 
25
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Qi  is the quantity assigned to price Pi, reported by distributors together with that price. 
 
TEA in (2) is not possible to quantify due to the fact that the variable Qi is not known to us, unlike the GFD. 
However, the GFD is able to perform the calculation because it has the data concerning all the variables. In case the 
letters in the formula (2) are substituted with concrete data, the extent of the risk zone can be identified. It can then 
be compared with the hitherto published values and above all, with official estimates of the Czech Ministry of 
Finance. 
  
ܴܼܳ ൌ σ ௜ܳ௡௜ୀ଴ , if ௜ܲ  ൏ ܯܲܮ, where        (3) 
 
QRZ  is the total number of sales within the risk zone. 
 
Equation (3) expresses the total volume of a certain fuel sold in the market during the given period that lies in the 
risk zone. If we compare it with the total volume of sales, we can ascertain the proportion of shadow economy in the 
monitored period. This identification can be made with a certain delay corresponding to the period under the special 
recording duty of fuel distributors. 
4. Conclusion 
In general we can point out the increasing methodological difficulties in the effort to detect the ever perfecting 
ways of concealing illegal conduct of taxpayers. The results of the respective measurements cannot be compared 
because the subjects of measurements are relatively diverse components of illegal activities, which require different 
methods. The issues of shadow economy encompass many fields of expertise, from criminalistics to economics and 
accounting. All this suggests the nonexistence of a universal method of measurement of its extent in the same way 
as there is not a single manner of practicing tax fraud. Therefore, it is always necessary to precisely define the 
forbidden, illegal or distorting activity or tax avoidance that is the subject of examination and measurement, and to 
adapt the methods applied. 
Another obstacle is that the effectiveness of the methods cannot be tested in laboratory conditions. The method 
verification requires historical data. A number of changes in tax policies of European and other countries have taken 
place recently. This provides space for historical research and testing of the existing methods, their innovation and 
development of new ones. We must, however take into account the rapidly changing world and diverse effects of 
numerous factors that may bring different results of application of a certain method using historical and current data.  
We have concluded that the existing methods of identification of tax evasion amount or measurement of shadow 
economy extent are not suitable for the analogous examination in the area of general excise tax in the form of value 
added tax on fuels applied in the Czech Republic. Thus, we had to develop original and specific methods appropriate 
for the definition of limits in order to designate certain prices in the fuel market as risky in terms of their potential 
affliction by tax fraud, for the quantification of the tax evasion amount in the monitored period and for the 
identification of the proportion of fuel whose sales may be affected by tax fraud. 
 The analysis of the concrete product and possibilities offered by fuel market was performed for the purpose of 
identifying the risk zone. Subsequently, a fictitious line was drawn, which separates the fuel prices attainable 
without illegal action and prices whose amount suggests that they can be described as potentially affected by tax 
evasion, assuming rational behavior of taxpayers who aim at the achievement of profit (1). The risk zone occurs if 
there is a lowest price in the market, located beneath the fictitious line in the given period. The risk zone is the area 
located between the fictitious line and the minimal price for which fuel was sold. An important implication of our 
findings is that by the illegal action, one group of entities, the tax evaders, is favored over the other group, taxpayers 
who properly pay taxes for the benefit of the state budget. Whereas the former increase their volume of sales, the 
market share and the directly related short-term profit through attractive prices, the latter are deprived of sales, and 
the situation means lower tax revenue of the public budgets. 
We have formulated the equation for concrete quantification of the absolute amount of potential tax evasion 
value (2) by means of relation between the prices in the fuel market and the identified risk zone. We have also 
identified the proportion of fuel transaction volume that may be affected by tax evasion (3). In order to quantify 
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concrete values, the data concerning prices of the respective distributors of fuel would be necessary; however the 
GFD only disclosed the information about minimal prices occurring in the market. Nevertheless, the GFD is easily 
able to implement our procedures. The results would be obtained with a certain delay, because the GFD first has to 
obtain data from distributors after the end of the calendar month in which the sales were realized. 
The results enable us to maintain that in the case of petrol Natural 95, in each moment at least one price existed, 
which was below the fictitious line. It means that the risk zone existed in each moment of the monitored period. We 
must note that although we selected the minimal price, the database contained even prices lower by more than  
1 CZK. In our view, the GFD should demand either correction or justification of the origin of the acquired goods as 
well as explanation of the manner of taxation from the distributor concerned. In general, an identified risk zone 
should be the first warning sign for the tax administrator, suggesting that a fraud in the form of economic crime was 
committed, and an inspection of the taxpayer should be initiated. 
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